

## THE MARSHALL FORCE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY CONSTABULARY FOR FUTURE DEMANDS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHAD B. MCREE  
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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**THE MARSHALL FORCE:  
A 21ST CENTURY CONSTABULARY FOR FUTURE DEMANDS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Chad B. McRee  
United States Army

Colonel Thomas Reilly  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

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This Student Research Project (SRP) examines the possibility of establishing a Military Police Division to serve as the U.S. Army’s modern day constabulary force. Specifically, it provides historical background that highlights the need for a standing constabulary force. It addresses the concerns and the apprehensions associated with such a large shift of U.S. Forces and specifically describe the merits of such reorganization. Finally, there are recommendations for providing efficiencies, expertise, and functionality in the establishment of an MP Division and also highlights other Army trends that could be examined to provide these same efficiencies and expertise across the full spectrum of Army capabilities.





## THE MARSHALL FORCE: A 21ST CENTURY CONSTABULARY FOR FUTURE DEMANDS

“Stability operations are a core U.S. Military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”<sup>1</sup>

Past studies examining U.S. military operations like Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, Restore Hope, and Joint Guardian conclude that the U.S. Military is capable of conducting combat operations in a highly effective manner. However, critics generally contend that the U.S. Military institutionally lacked the commitment and expertise to conduct Peace Keeping and Stability Operations (PKSO) in an effective and efficient manner. Frequently, the U.S. military views this phase of the operation as a mission for the State Department, international agencies (United Nations) and or other non-Department of Defense agencies.

The truth of the matter is, the Department of Defense and specifically the Army is the one organization best led and equipped to lead phase IV operations more commonly referred to as the Stability, Security, and Reconstruction (often interchangeably described as Peace-Keeping, Stability Operations) operations. In recent years there has been a resurgence of constabulary force type concepts and requirements, but historically a Constabulary Force has been designed to provide law and order, but Phase IV operations require far more than simply law and order operations. Phase IV operations require full spectrum reconstruction, that includes;

infrastructure renovations, security, essential services restored, governments reseated, and often times a complete rebuilding of a nation.

Invariably the Army inherits the responsibility for these missions, but due to a lack of deliberate planning, anticipation, and acceptance of this requirement the military often times has assumed the mission and stumbled through the PKSO process. Institutionally the Army may lack the capability to adequately support PKSO requirements and this may be due to poor structure, therefore it may be essential to future PKSO success to create that capability internally to the institution. The support to PKSO is often times an ongoing requirement that may be conducted simultaneously while hostilities continue or it may be a requirement unilateral to combat operations. Structure and competing demands have generally resulted in PKSO getting less institutional support than combat operations. However the greatest detractor from successful PKSO may be an institutional belief that our Military should not conduct such operations. This position has been a long standing argument for decades.

On 21 June 1945, Clay (LTG Lucious D. Clay) told ....a committee that the War Department believed military government was not a job for Soldiers and should, therefore, be turned over to the political as soon as practical. President Truman had said, more than a month before, that he wanted control in Germany shifted to civilian hands as quickly as possible because he believed it was in the American tradition that the military should not have governmental responsibilities beyond the requirements of military operations.<sup>2</sup>

This same type of resistance today, has continued and generally leads to less value being placed on these operations during initial planning phases. Addressing this specific issue, Colonel (RET) Peter Mansoor cites a RAND Corporation Study in his new book, "Baghdad at Sunrise," that says,

By not including civil police in its nation building operations, the burden for handling public security in Iraq fell upon coalition military forces, which are ill-prepared. Iraq demonstrates that the military mission of providing security in the post conflict environment is just as important to achieving a strategic victory, if not more important, than the military mission of winning decisive combat operations.<sup>3</sup>

These planning failures hamper the institutional effectiveness to achieve the desired end-state of peace, stability, security, and economic growth in theaters destroyed by war. This paper compares the research completed by several professional military officers regarding the establishment of “constabulary type” forces and provides a recommendation for the establishment of a 21st Century constabulary unit called the Marshall Force.

FM 3-07 Stability Operations states that the integrated approach to stability operations requires a framework that applies across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. It must frame purposeful intervention at any point along that spectrum, reflecting the execution of a wide range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational environments...that included post-conflict environments following the general cessation of organized hostilities.<sup>4</sup> For the purposes of this Strategy Research Project (SRP) the use of Constabulary, constabulary force, Peace Keeping and Stability Operations (PKSO), peace making, peace enforcement, nation building, and reconstruction is used interchangeably when discussing the topic of PKSO. Acknowledgment to the fact that they are not inclusively the same and that each depiction has its own set of functions is given, but also true is the interrelationship between these concepts and the overarching requirement for nation building and PKSO at the conclusion of a major theater war or in some instances, to avert war.

This SRP specifically addresses the need for the establishment of a standing PKSO type force, also considered a modern day constabulary force. This is not to say that the U.S. Military should necessarily accept unilateral responsibility for the growing requirements of PKSO, but specifically this paper addresses the much accepted view that a PKSO mission is now a core requirement for the Army and it discusses the means and ways for establishing such a standing capability within the U.S. Army that can serve as the United States of America's contribution alongside other national efforts in a fused and synchronized effort. It was only recently that this requirement was embraced by the Department of Defense, even though this has been written about in numerous papers and articles over the years.

While many have acknowledged the need for a standing PKSO type structure this paper goes further in recommending that the requirement be led by the U.S. Army Military Police Corps. Further, it provides justification regarding a military restructuring process that provides both greater war-fighting capabilities, provides a greater capability and capacity to execute PKSO type requirements, while maintaining an edge in war fighting core competencies. The requirement to rebuild nations destroyed by war is paramount for national security, for regional stability, for the advancement of human rights, and for a litany of other reasons. To provide a comprehensive reconstruction effort however, does begin to erode combat effectiveness of those combat units chartered with operations other than war. This has been an on-going debate for many years, and during the 21<sup>st</sup> century this debate continues to be validated and addressed.

### The Challenge That Lies Ahead

In September 2008 the Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey spoke to Soldiers and Families of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division in Hawaii and emphasized concerns that the US Military, specifically combat arms Soldiers have experienced a degradation in their core competencies. To remedy this General Casey was going to direct that a portion of the current training environment be dedicated to Soldiers training in their specific field craft. For example, he wants Soldiers in the Armor to once again compete on gunnery tables, Field Artillery Soldiers to train at accurately conducting gun crew skills, shooting and providing counter fire, and he wants the Infantry to hone their skills in small unit tactics.

As previously mentioned, with the ongoing requirement for the U.S. Military to provide support to operations other than war the theme of degrading combat skills, mission creep, and responsibility for these types of missions continues. Over the last decade there have been at least a dozen War College Research Papers written that have argued for the need of a standing U.S. constabulary type force. Consistently, the Department of Defense position is that PKSO and nation building were not the responsibility of the U.S. Military, but a combination of diplomatic and “soft power” capabilities.

However, in light of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense has taken a different position, accepting that stability operations are now a core mission of the U.S. Military. While DOD’s position may have shifted, the argument still holds true that our military must also be prepared principally to fight its nation’s wars. Therefore, the long standing argument that combat soldiers are losing their field craft skills because they are being tasked to conduct peace-keeping and stability

operations remains true and accurate. However, with the acknowledgement of this new core mission the U.S. Military would benefit by acknowledging too that there are other occupational specialties better equipped to initiate PKSO other than our combat arms branches and in turn by using these other specialties the U.S. military can deploy, conduct combat operations, and transition to performing PKSO without degrading combat capabilities.

Few would argue that combat soldiers need to train and maintain superior combat skills capabilities. In order for combat arms soldiers to maintain a high level of combat skills, they must be rotated out of combat theaters, regenerated, re-equipped, and immersed back into the training base as soon as possible in order to be prepared for future conflicts. However, current circumstances have placed the requirement of PKSO on combat arms soldiers. As a result of these operations other than war, the skills, morale, and potentially the combat effectiveness of our principle combat soldiers is eroding.

Senior leaders within the Department of Defense acknowledge the importance of having a capability to conduct PKSO, unbeknownst to many that capability exists within our force today.

BG Colleen McGuire wrote in her SRP in 2001 entitled, "Constabulary training for a full spectrum force" that after the battle is won and conflict has been contained ...the Army's experience on the ground, its involvement with the people and the interim security and control measures established- the Army...is integral to the success of future civil governance which in turn, helps ultimately to ensure the a palatable exit strategy for the military. She goes on to state, "Doctrinally, the Military Police battalion

has an inherent constabulary capability...and the infantry battalion does not.<sup>5</sup> BG McGuire does a comprehensive job of outlining the history of the constabulary and makes a strong argument for the training that must ensue for a constabulary or PKSO to be effective. She further acknowledges the importance of Military Police in operations other than war, but she does not recommend a specific force be given the lead for command and control of a constabulary type force.

Colonel Karl Knoblauch states in a 1998 SRP entitled "Constabularies in future peace operations" "...the principle challenge is force composition and relative competencies of coalition forces for constabulary operations. It can be assumed that Military Police and National Police contingents possess many of the requisite constabulary skills and would provide significant technical and operational contributions.

<sup>6</sup> Knoblauch wrote this paper ten years ago and while the role of the U.S. Soldier has changed dramatically, what continues to be asked of the U.S. military has changed very little. Soldier actions have become globally amplified in many respects and what now is expected of a modern day constabulary has also been amplified due to the modern military's capabilities and capacity. However what does remain true is the core competencies required in any PKS- operation and most vital is the need for security to create stability, the command and control to synchronize efforts and fuse enablers, and the ability to view contentious areas as something other than high intensity combat zones. These requirements may best be provided by the Military Police.

#### The Military Police at a Glance

The MP Corps is uniquely qualified to serve as the leading organization to command and control PKSO in a theater of operation. Whether in a garrison or in a

combat theater of operation the core competencies of the MP Corps are to provide protection and safety to the communities they serve. Training and oversight to police and security services are on-going in the life of Military Police units. These units routinely work with community leadership and establish partnerships and assistance initiatives that promote external law enforcement agencies to support the overarching military mission. MP units orchestrate a host of agencies, directorates, and initiatives that ensure and enhance security for military communities and help shape an environment suited for effective community operations and leadership. Further, the MP Corps is proven to be highly effective in both combat operations and operations other than war with a large focus on nation building efforts. Somalia, Honduras, Panama, and Haiti are good examples of strong police efforts that contributed dramatically to the safety and security of specified operations. While many would argue that Somalia was a U.S. Military failure there is strong evidence to suggest that prior to June 1993 the Military Police were instrumental in quelling violence, establishing order (albeit minimal), and making contributions that were helping the people of Somalia. This is not to suggest that the U.S. Military Police are the complete answer to successful PKSO, but they may very well be the best suited military branch to be given the responsible for commanding/controlling and orchestrating the litany of requirements associated with a modern day constabulary force requirements. Clearly there is a need for stability operations and nation building at the conclusion of hostilities. As previously mentioned, in many military circles this continues to be argued, but the Department of Defense has accepted this as a core mission for the U.S. military, and rather than argue this further,



ownership needs to be assigned, resources allocated, and deliberate plans need to be developed with an organization in the lead.

### The Challenges

Generally the greatest obstacle in creating new requirements and initiatives is resources, and personnel are the most costly of those resources. Competing demands will continue to challenge the personnel system and therefore finding a branch of personnel best trained and capable to execute multi-functional requirements is essential. As previously discussed there is evidence to show why U.S. Army Military Police may be the best equipped and trained to lead the military efforts in PKSO given the wide range of daily tasks they are trained to conduct in garrison and the capacity to adapt that same type of leadership, training, and insight into a PKSO type operations.

Many researchers have concluded that a structure needs to be established to tackle the enormous task of leading PKSO operations. Military professionals from combat arms to combat support arms all acknowledge the need for a standing force capable of conducting PKSO. LTC Gilbert A. Nelson wrote in a 2001 U.S. Army War College Student Research Project entitled “The U.S. Military Role in Supporting the Rule of Law in Peace Operations and other Complex contingencies” that there exists an urgent need for a permanent constabulary structure with the appropriate training, organization, equipment, and doctrine. Further, he goes on to say that this will mean a loss of current organizational warfighting structure to serve as the bill payer. Additionally, LTC Gilbert recognizes the need for a division size organization to conduct this mission, but he deliberately discounts the use of U.S. Military Police preferring to establish a more specialized unit called a “Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU).”<sup>7</sup>

While this recommendation of establishing a force prepared to respond and execute constabulary and PKSO type duties is based on some well qualified experiences for no apparent reason it deliberately ignores the expertise that currently exists within the present day U.S. Army Military structure of our Military Police. There is no argument that the force needed to execute PKSO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be a new type of Hybrid with unconventional, newly ascribed capabilities. This force will rely on strong C2, security, and highly progressive and creative insights to enable all elements of national power necessary to achieve long-term stability for the targeted area.

While current doctrine states that to be effective in reconstruction efforts, there must be security, stability, and a clear demonstration of progress to the people affected, that clear demonstration to the people is generally attributed first and foremost to a sense of security. Law Enforcement services is one of the quintessential elements necessary for establishing a rule of law, providing security and stability to a populace, and providing a clear measure of progress to an area ravaged by war or catastrophe. So in order to make marked improvements quickly, combat forces need to be replaced with Police and Security Forces postured with the capability to execute kinetic operations if stability falters, but with the training to transition to low intensity police operations without creating a vacuum as combat forces are transitioned out.

BG Lloyd Miles wrote in a 2002 Student Research Paper entitled Back to the Future; Constabulary Forces Revisited that, "combat units are the most adaptable units to deploy into the uncertain environment of peace operations. Properly educated, trained and equipped Soldiers will get the job done. Constabulary forces are an option,

but the risks on the higher end of the spectrum of conflict and the dangerous nature of the mission, would argue against the formation of special units.”<sup>8</sup>

Again, BG Miles sees the need for a standing structure to support PKSO, but his argument falls short when identifying a force that can conduct such actions. It is important to understand fully what a PKSO requires and to conceptualize what this type of force would entail in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and beyond. Further that force also needs to have an existing capability to conduct combat operations if peace fails. In essence, a 21<sup>st</sup> century constabulary force must encompass a full spectrum capability. It must provide effective law enforcement and security, training, oversight, essential service expertise, a direction for effective governance, and construction/reconstruction and also aid in economic recovery. This force must have the capacity to provide the services similar to what the Marshall plan did at the conclusion of WWII in Europe.

### The Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan, known as the European Recovery Program, *ERP*)...

was the height of American generosity and internationalism. After World War II, ...Secretary of State George C. Marshall began an effort to build grass-roots support for a massive grant program...But it took more than money to reconstruct Germany. After the war, law and order was a pressing problem and, unless managed, would have swallowed any and all international assistance. Accordingly, the U.S. took 30,000 of the nearly 100,000 war-weary U.S. soldiers still in Germany and ordered them to assume policing duties. A newly formed constabulary was issued special boots, .45-caliber pistols and horses in order to deal with the likelihood of riots and local scuffles. Each brigade was even assigned a veterinarian. The "Circle C Cowboys," known to the Germans as the "lightning police," eventually had their own training courses and a very new idea about what was required to promote American interests overseas.<sup>9</sup>

This is not to say that the U.S. Military should be the sole provider for a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan in Europe had support by the U.S. Military,

but they were not the sole provider then, nor should this suggest they be the sole provider now. In fact a 21<sup>st</sup> century plan should encompass all the elements of power if it is to be viable and successful. The U.S. Military's requirements in a modern day Marshall Plan consists of those fundamental requirements in Peace Keeping and Stability Operations (PKSO), but PKS operations are far more complicated than ever before. They encompasses everything from keeping people safe with police and firefighters to city infrastructure support, recycling capabilities, balancing budgets, globalized economics, and competent governance. The structure needed to support nation building must be proficient in its understanding of city management, budgets, and the residual effects associated with lacks in security, crime prevention, and failures in essential services. The force currently in the present structure that is ready and capable of commanding such efforts is the Military Police Corps. They deploy as combat soldiers, but are trained to de-escalate tensions quickly, establish order, and operate effectively in operations other than war, with the immense capacity to escalate force as necessary. Further, present day active component Military Police organizations are fused into the day to day operations of the communities in which they serve and have a prominent position in the effective orchestration of successful communities.

The undertaking of a standing constabulary capability is a large commitment by the Department of Defense. This commitment will require the Army to recruit thousands of new Soldiers or internally reallocate personnel from less required branches in order to outfit the new units that are in higher demand. The force must have the capacity to serve effectively in a variety of circumstances and be relevant even when not deployed.

### The Growth of an Industry

The greatest shortfall of the U.S. Army MP Corps is the size of the branch. The MP Corps is one of the Army's smallest branches, yet in high demand for their capability and expertise. A force estimated at just under 15,000 total, the MP Corps makes up about 5% of the total active force. Based partially on this figure the solution in most instances to provide security has been to take combat arms units ("in lieu" of units as they are known) and to quickly train them to execute police type missions. While the U.S. Military has been somewhat effective with this premise, many experts also recognize that the combat arms mentality or focus has been a hindrance to highly effective PKSO. This is not an indictment on the combat arms branches, but police work is a science that takes expertise, training, and a technical skill set necessary if it is to be exacted with precision, professionalism, and effectiveness. To think we can simply throw any Soldier or any leader into this role is a miscalculation. To make this point a bit more clear consider Abu Ghraib or the events that occurred early on at Guantanamo Bay Cuba. In both instances the leadership were not trained and educated in the science of detention operations and subsequently the Army adopted poorly advised tactics in handling prisoners. Directives given were not based on sound professional judgments conceived through a lifetime of service in the sciences of police services, but through a generalist view of military operations from a combat arms perspective. Had the Army appointed a professional full-time Military Police leader to command and oversee operations at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, this situation may have been avoided.

Some argue that the Army did this by appointing BG Lipinski to Abu Ghraib, but the fact of the matter is, she was not a full-time professional Military Police Officer. She

spent the preponderance of her reserve component career in other detailed branches and did not serve her entire career in the active component of the military leading. Therefore her experience with police, confinement specialists, and personnel trained in the requirements of oversight, intelligence collection, command and control to police and confinement operations on a daily basis was less substantial.

Specifically, in the case of confinement operations the U.S. Army has a litany of experts who have been raised working, commanding, and orchestrating operations at the U.S. disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. BG Colleen McGuire mentioned earlier in this paper commanded a battalion and the brigade equivalent (U.S. Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth) prior to her selection to Brigadier General. Even in the Civilian Police Assistance and Transition (CPAT) command in Iraq today, we have yet to place a Military Police General Officer in overall command of this important endeavor. Time and again, leaders at every level have acknowledged that the failures in stability are directly linked to a lack of police services and competently trained host nation police and security forces. Therefore it stands to reason that one of the largest organizations chartered with the oversight for Iraqi Police training should be commanded by a professional Military Police Officer. It was not until July of 2008 that the U.S. Army appointed the first Active Duty MP General Officer to command Joint Task Force 134 (oversight of Confinement/Detainee Operations) in Iraq.

Clearly, the Marshall Force of the future needs to encompass more than a law enforcement capability, but law enforcement officials are generally considered the natural leaders when it comes to emergency response and the handling of catastrophic events in a civilian community, a military community, within a large building/industrial

complex. Therefore, the MP may be the right choice as our military attempts to place a different face on its forces as they transition from combat operations to PKSO and national reconstruction. “For peace keeping operations to be successful an environment of stability must exist. This environment must be created through a thorough understanding of all the factors surrounding what makes a nation exist at the basic levels. The need for a constabulary type unit to provide the basic law and order function in the initial post hostilities phases of reconstruction or nation building are key today in all conceivable scenarios.”<sup>10</sup>

Military leaders generally recognize that PKSO is a line of operation that may be conducted simultaneously or in concert with other types of combat operations. General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command talks about the three block war, where combat operations may be conducted on one block while three blocks over forces may be conducting PKS type operations. If this is the type of requirement that will be placed on U.S. forces for the foreseeable future it confirms the need for a force that can transition from high intensity combat operations into operations other than war with minimal degradation in their warfighting skills and core competencies.

In recent operations in Iraq there are a multitude of examples of Marshall Force Operations that have netted drastic improvements in reconciliation, reconstruction, and law and order. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders that leaned heavily on MP leaders, engineers, Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) leaders, and civil affairs experts for guidance and recommendations were able to more quickly and effectively change the dynamics of the sectors under their respective control. It was through a more harmonious and concerted effort, many commanders have made marked

improvements in their areas of responsibility all because they leveraged the experts. On the converse many failures can be attributed to parochial biases regarding command and control, land ownership, and the fundamental failures of tapping into the expert resources readily available in theater. By acknowledging the professional knowledge scattered throughout their respective sectors and leveraging that expert leadership, a commander is more prone to net positive results. Those same sources of expertise are already supporting and conducting combat operations, they are helping shape the environment in an effort to stabilize areas in order to transition into a stability operational environment, so a key to success is using them across the full spectrum of requirements of the modern day battlefield.

#### So, What is the Solution?

As previously described, the MP Corps in particular is a branch with a wide assortment of capabilities and expertise, but they lack the structure and personnel to conduct all the operations necessary in a PKSO environment. As a result the U.S. military generally, robs Peter to pay Paul. In other words they take other branches away from their expertise to fill voids the MP Corps desperately needs to fill. Rather than do this, the institution needs to enlarge the MP Corps by three to five active duty MP Brigades. By doing this they can eliminate the need to use in lieu of units, this will allow combat arms branches to concentrate on core competencies, and minimize the distracters so often associated with units performing functions they are neither designed nor trained to perform.

So based on the preceding discussion how does this relate to the establishment of a Constabulary Force? Many researchers have recommended structure specifically



designed to conduct PKSO type operations. Clearly most would acknowledge that some type of structure is required and necessary as the United States continues to lead the world as a responsible super power.

This is not to say that the United States should be the sole proprietor of PKSO for the world, but as far as the national military contribution is concerned, the United States needs to provide a trained and ready force, versed in the complexities of constabulary/nation building operations, capable of leading and operating in both kinetic and non-kinetic environments. By providing the expertise and leadership the environment can be shaped more rapidly and effectively in preparation to transition the military out and other intergovernmental organizations in. Gilbert argues..." Military Police would be best suited to man the maneuver elements of these types of constabulary units. MP are trained to be able to conduct limited scale combat operations...Their law enforcement role ideally suits them to participate in conflict resolution, crowd control, convoy security, and a host of other skills required in PKSO and small scale contingency operations....they could serve in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, while freeing up conventional ground forces to focus on preparation and the conduct of Major Theater Wars." <sup>11</sup> Gilbert is exactly right, but this thought needs to be expanded to include; Major Theater of War (MTW) follow-on forces that transition from combat operations to PKSO. Military Police are already present in MTW and in recent years have played a significant role in combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, they are unique in that they can transition seamlessly from full spectrum combat operations to full spectrum operations other than war. Even during combat operations the MP are seen as a Professional Police Force.

Time and again Iraqis have remarked about the trust and confidence they have for U.S. Army Military Police and this view by the population transitions nicely into PKSO and the establishment of a stable environment.

In order to establish a standing Division size organization there will have to be size reductions in other branches or an allowance to expand the size of the active force specifically targeting the need to increase the size of the MP Corps. Gilbert recognizes that to establish such a structure will mean a loss in combat arms structure, but he also recognizes that there is a payoff as well. That payoff is, "Core competencies being resurrected, maintained, and combat forces focusing on war fighting skills." <sup>12</sup> The personnel affected will not only be at the tactical level, this may also mean some realignment in General Officer (GO) billets and to personnel policy in general. Consideration should be given to GO positions being taken from traditional branches and given to establish a new division. This division would be manned fundamentally by Military Police and logisticians. The Military Police Division can deploy initially as a combat multiplier ideally as current operations have demonstrated, but as transition in theater begins the MP Division can assume the major role of commanding, controlling, and orchestrating Peace Keeping and Stability/Security Operations. During peacetime this active MP Division structure would remain in the active structure and could have the oversight over all MP Operations in CONUS. (Currently, no single MP General Officer or HQs commands day to day MP Operations). The MP Division Commander could be responsible for "command oversight" of day to day Law Enforcement at Army posts nation wide. Further he/she could serve as the principal Training and Readiness Oversight authority in preparing traditional MP units, MP Support to Brigade Combat

Teams and Maneuver Enhanced Brigades to deploy to a theater and provide the expertise necessary to effectively perform combat support and PKSO missions. Finally, the MP Division HQs could serve as the Army's Northern Command TF HQs in times of instability or catastrophe in the United States.

In regards to MP oversight, this arrangement is not to negate installation commanders and senior mission commanders, but clearly this mission is becoming increasingly important and therefore it would be logical to get MP command expertise working alongside Division and TF Commanding Generals to ensure the best possible support available. With the MP Division also serving as a standing TF HQs ready to support Northern Command requirements, this may also eliminate the need to pull another Head Quarters from the force to fulfill this requirement.

#### During Conflict

During conflict the MP division would have a TCF assigned to it on a rotational basis (similar to a Division Readiness Brigade or Battalion), an Engineer unit (both civil and vertical oriented) and or a Maneuver Enhance Brigade alongside three MP Brigades.

Additional assets would serve to provide the infrastructure support necessary for reconstruction, intelligence collection, aviation, transportation, medical support and security. Additional specialties needed to have a full complement of capabilities could be added to include a Foreign Service section to lead diplomatic initiatives and help orchestrate a myriad of functions that require this type of expertise.

Where will the increase in personnel come from? The best case scenario would be to raise the ceiling on end-strength force levels, but in this time of financial

uncertainty what would probably be required is a right sizing initiative that would require a reduction of Artillery, Armor, and Air Defense positions to pay for the expansion associated with the creation of a standing constabulary. Arguably over the years there has been a decline in the need for the levels of Artillery demanded before and during the Cold War. A great argument for the surge in 2006 was to focus on the fight at hand and focus less on the “what ifs.” This same focus may hold true and rather than focus on the possible need in the future for certain combat arms forces, the focus needs to be on what is needed now and for the foreseeable future. There is evidence that a reduction in some combat arms branches is not nearly as risky as parochial mindsets would contend. A precedent for this has already been set with no major ill effects, as the preponderance of in lieu units used in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have been created from Artillery units. Air Defense has also experienced a reduction in requirements and Armor units may be larger than needed in the future. A comprehensive bottom up requirements review may be necessary.

With the establishment of a MP Constabulary Division the force retains some enormous combat power, through these multi-purpose troops. The Commanding General would be a Major General with a background rooted and educated from the MP Branch. He/she would have an ADC-M who should be of a combat arms background and an ADC-S from either Logistician or Engineer background or with experience gained from service in the newly created Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEB).

The Division would be organized with five Active Duty Brigades, with up to four MP Brigades and one or more MEBs or a unit of complimentary capabilities. Within the MEB would be a cross functional battalion made up of Infantry, Mech, and an Artillery

capabilities. Additionally, the MEB would have engineers, logisticians to include transportation, contracting officials, medical service, signal expertise, and a robust intelligence capability. Within each MP Brigade would be the inherent MTOE to include Civil Affairs Detachments, finance sections, Intelligence experts, and LNOs to serve with the Engineers, maneuver forces, and civil works personnel. Within the Division Staff would be positions for state department representation to include USAID, and provisional reconstruction experts versed in City Management and essential services.

“In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence continue to complicate international relations. These conditions create belts of fragility and instability that present a grave threat to national security. While journeying into this uncertain future, leaders will increasingly call on stability operations to reduce the drivers of conflict and instability and build local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth.”<sup>13</sup> As previously stated, for the foreseeable future U.S. forces will be serving in an era of persistent conflict or at minimum, an era of persistent disruption and the MP Division would have the capacity to maintain a credible posture on a recurring basis with this additional force structure added to the current traditional five tactical MP Brigades serving in our Army. As steady state is achieved Guard and Reserve MP and Logistics forces could serve under the Division Command, or in a Division (-) posture (for example, a Brigade heavy structure). If a time were to come that our forces were not deployed in large elements the MP Division could continue to train in their core competencies which are generally in line with their peace time requirements and functions. They would continue to hone skills in providing essential Police Services to

respective installations, and enhance their own capabilities with a “work with industry initiative” serving with the DEA, FBI, Border Patrol, and metropolitan police departments. By using this time wisely their capabilities become greater and the ability to reach out and tap into additional resources of expertise become far greater. They could increase their capabilities in organic investigative capabilities (currently provided by MP Investigators and the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC)). Their need for an advanced understanding of forensics could be impacted and opportunities for select MP professionals to seek advanced degrees in forensics and investigations would increase. Officers at the Field Grade level could gain enterprise experience by working with city managers, essential service personnel, and in city Emergency Response Centers to further gain understanding and expertise in these highly technical areas. Again, none of this would take away from their current professional development as this is directly in line with their required core skill set. With the establishment of a Division of this type, those serving in the Division would increase their professional expertise and not be disadvantaged with new tracks for training and branch qualification. Additionally, this would ensure that war fighters continue on their respective tracks and gain the experience and training in their core competencies, while finding themselves less diverted towards areas that degrade their war fighting skills.

### Conclusion

The United States needs to have a standing capability to conduct peace keeping and stability operations. As currently configured the U.S. military and specifically the Army do not have the enduring capacity to properly conduct MTW while simultaneously or intermittently providing the PKSO support required for effective nation building.

Clearly with a new proclamation by DOD that a core military mission is PKSO institutionally the military needs to identify a branch who can best serve as the lead in this new initiative. There will be a personnel bill associated with the establishment of such an important initiative and likely this will appear at the onset to degrade war fighting capabilities, but realistically it will have a streamlining effect that will enable combat forces more time to train and prepare for MTW while at the same time prime and prepare standing forces for the important transition from hostilities to nation building efforts. The Military Police Corps is the “Force of Choice,” as described by Major General Chuck Hines in 1992.<sup>14</sup> This statement is truer today than when first used almost two decades ago. Clearly at the conclusion of hostilities responsible nations must provide the follow-on work necessary to rebuild the nation destroyed by war. It is not enough to simply quell the violence, without stability, without hope, without direction warring nations will slide back into disarray and back into turmoil.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), vi.

<sup>2</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, (Washington, DC; Center of Military History United States Army, 1975), 401.

<sup>3</sup> RAND Corporation, *Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies*, (Washington D.C., February 7, 2007), quoted by Peter R. Mansoor, *Baghdad at Sunrise* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2008), 25-26.,

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-3.

<sup>5</sup> Colleen L. McGuire, *Constabulary training for a full spectrum force*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks; U.S. Army War College, April 2001), 4-6.

<sup>6</sup> Karl B. Knoblauch, *Constabularies in future peace operations*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks; U.S. Army War College, April 1998), 22.

<sup>7</sup> Gilbert A. Nelson, *The U.S. Military Role in Supporting the Rule of Law in Peace Operations and other Complex contingencies*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks; U.S. Army War College, March 2001), 10-11.

<sup>8</sup> Lloyd Miles, *Back to the Future; Constabulary Forces Revisited*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks; U.S. Army War College, April 2002), 16.

<sup>9</sup> Rachel Bronson, "Talk Is Cheap, a Marshall Plan Isn't," *Los Angeles Times*, August 4, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Keith R. LoveJoy, *A Peacekeeping Force for Future Operations: Another reassessment of the constabulary Force Concept*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks; U.S. Army War College, April 2003), 7.

<sup>11</sup> Gilbert A. Nelson, *The U.S. Military Role in Supporting the Rule of Law in Peace Operations and other Complex contingencies*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks; U.S. Army War College, March 2001), 14.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-2 thru 1-3.

<sup>14</sup> Charles A. Hines, "Military Police in Contingency Operations: Often the Force of Choice," *Parameters*, (September 1990): 11-18.